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We examine the effectiveness of alternate choice architectures for health plan choice in US 
marketplaces under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) using three experiments based on the Health 
Reform Monitoring Survey: two experiments tested how choice architectures used in presenting 
information on health plans influenced plan choices and how existing designs could be 
improved; the third experiment checked the robustness of the choice architecture effects to more 
naturalistic choice scenarios in which consumers select plans when future medical spending is 
uncertain. More vulnerable consumers (e.g., worse health, lower literacy) experienced the largest 
relative improvements when ACA marketplace plans were displayed and sorted by total expected 
costs for the year rather than premiums (Experiment 1). The benefits of sorting plans by total 
expected costs was not improved further by making the importance of total expected costs more 
salient or by providing just-in-time education about such costs (Experiment 2). However, just-in-
time education increased the likelihood consumers did not choose a plan, suggesting they may be 
in the process of updating their plan selection strategy given the new information. Broadly, these 
results were consistent across alternative scenarios where total expected costs were subject to  
uncertainty and consistent with expected patterns of consumer behavior under risk aversion 
(Experiment 3). Thus, a policy-feasible mechanism—sorting health plan options by and 
highlighting total expected costs—may improve health plan choices, saving money for 
consumers and the government. 






With the implementation of the main provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2014, 
the long-dormant market for individual health insurance reemerged as a key component of the 
U.S. health care system. Indeed, following the inception of the ACA, millions of Americans have 
purchased health insurance for the first time in their lives through new health insurance 
marketplaces.1 While having insurance has provided access to care and financial risk protection 
for many, choosing a health plan has proven to be a daunting task. The typical American seeking 
coverage from the ACA marketplaces for 2019 (also called “exchanges”) had 26 plans from 
which to choose (ASPE 2018)—far more than individuals in the employer-sponsored market 
(Claxton et al., 2018). Moreover, the decision environment is complex: choices vary on many 
dimensions, including the particular benefits covered, cost-sharing requirements (such as 
deductibles, coinsurance, and copayments), and the providers available in each plan’s network.   
The marketplaces not only present a complex decision environment, but many consumers 
often lack the experience, knowledge, and ability to evaluate information and make effective 
health plan choices. Interviews with stakeholders about the marketplaces reveal, for example, 
that consumers feel anxious about making the wrong choices, and are not confident that they can 
make the necessary complex calculations about costs (Housten et al., 2016). First-time shoppers 
on the marketplaces report difficulties specifically with determining whether doctors were in a 
health plan’s network, understanding differences in health plans and costs under the health plans, 
and knowing whom to contact with questions about their health plans options (Sinaiko, 
Kingsdale, & Galbraith, 2017). Others have reported that consumers enrolled in health plans 
                                                 
1 There is one federal marketplace that covers people living in 28 states, and about a dozen state-based marketplaces 





through the marketplace often do not understand basic insurance terminology (Barcellos et al., 
2014; Blumberg et al., 2013), and many consumers have poor comprehension of health plans as 
presented on the healthcare.gov website (Wang, Scherr, Wong, & Ubel, 2017) and low health 
literacy (Politi et al., 2014). Furthermore, studies have found that even individuals who possess 
insurance via their employer lack knowledge about their health plan (Loewenstein et al., 2013). 
There is, in addition, evidence that employees sometimes opt for dominated health plans (defined 
as plans that are inferior in every attribute, including, for example, premiums, risk protection, 
and quality, compared to other plans available in the choice set), a tendency that is especially 
pronounced among older and lower wage employees (Bhargava, Loewenstein & Sydnor, 2015; 
Sinaiko & Hirth, 2011). Indeed, this phenomenon could also be seen in the much simpler market 
for prescription drug coverage (Medicare Part D). Although benefits and costs of alternative 
choices for stand-alone drug plans are easier to assess and compare, mounting evidence indicates 
that many people are not choosing cost-effective plans. One of the most frequent mistakes in 
choosing drug coverage is focusing too much on a low deductible (Abaluck & Gruber 2009; 
Zhou & Zhang, 2012). 
When the marketplaces began in 2014, purchasers generally had at their disposal only 
rudimentary choice architecture tools to facilitate effective plan choices. In nearly all cases, 
marketplace websites arrayed health plans from lowest to highest premiums. No marketplace 
allowed consumers to calculate how much they would expect to spend during the year in total 
under alternate plans: that is, on premiums as well as cost-sharing requirements (Wong et al., 
2016). This often resulted in the consumer putting too much emphasis on low premiums, and not 





and co-insurance, and out-of-pocket spending maximums, as well as ratings of health plan 
quality. 
Since then, many of the marketplaces have become more sophisticated. Influenced by the 
emerging area of behavioral economics, researchers have offered a range of options on how to 
improve consumers’ choices in the marketplaces. Politi and colleagues (2016), for example, 
developed a decision aid to help consumers make better health plan decisions. Johnson et al. 
(2012) reviewed a range of tools that can be utilized to improve the choice architecture for 
comparing health plans, and in another study (Johnson et al., 2013) evaluated the merit of 
introducing default health plan options. Finally, some states have decided to reduce the number 
of plans being offered as a way to simplify the decision environment (Monahan et al., 2013).  
In 2016–2017, just seven of the 13 marketplaces surveyed by Wong and colleagues (2018) 
provided an online total-cost calculator, although notably this included the federal marketplace.  
One feature of these calculators is that they are based, to some degree, on either the person’s 
assessment of their own health status or actual data on their prior use of care. This is critical 
because the most cost-effective plan for a healthy person, who will probably use few or no 
services, is likely not the most cost-effective plan for a very sick person who frequently uses 
care. The former will tend to spend less in total by purchasing a low-premium plan, while the 
latter is likely to find plans with low cost-sharing requirements but higher premiums to be more 
cost-effective.2 
                                                 
2 Of course, selecting a health plan based upon the lowest total expected costs is not the only criteria for choosing a 
plan. A very sick person might well choose the plan that has the providers they want even if it costs more since they 
place a high value on who their provider is. And someone who cannot afford the plan with the lowest total expected 
costs might pick another plan that he/she can afford and hope they can avoid needing care (e.g., going without 






But even if consumers have total expected costs for each plan available to them, this 
information may not be displayed prominently. As noted by Wong et al., (2016), “To nudge 
consumers towards plans that may be better choices, Marketplaces could consider presenting 
plans in more sophisticated default orders, such as in order of total estimated out-of-pocket 
spending or best fit, using a ‘smart default’ (that is, a preselected cost-effective option based on 
the consumer’s estimated usage, preferences, or both)” (p. 686). It is noteworthy that on the 
federal marketplace, which is the one used by most Americans who purchase coverage through 
the marketplace, even when the website calculates total expected costs, plans are still arrayed 
from lowest to highest premium. (Some of the state-based websites, such as California and the 
District of Columbia, do array from lowest to highest total expected costs.)   
In a recent study, Barnes et al., (2017) conducted an experiment with a sample of over 7,600 
survey participants, half of whom received information about their total expected costs under 
three health plans, and half of whom did not. Instead, the latter group was provided only 
information on premiums, deductibles, copayments, and maximum annual out-of-pocket costs.  
Controlling for an array of socioeconomic and health status factors, it was found that providing 
total expected cost information improved the probability of choosing the most cost-effective plan 
between 3.0 and 10.6 percentage points. Importantly, more vulnerable groups were helped most 
by the information on total expected cost, including adults with less education, non-white adults, 
and adults with lower family income, as well as adults reporting any unmet health care needs in 
the past year due to costs. 
While the aforementioned study provides encouraging results, it did not fully take advantage 
of available choice architecture tools currently in use in the ACA marketplaces. Participants in 





highlighted. Rather, it was listed in the last row of information provided about the plan. And, 
such tools were not paired with efforts to educate consumers about total costs to see whether plan 
choices could be improved further by combining choice architecture and education. Further, the 
experimental designs were an abstraction of marketplace choices in naturalistic settings. Studies 
that incorporate consumer behavior under uncertainty are needed to better simulate the 
influences of choice architecture tools on health plan decision-making.  
1.1 New Contribution 
In this paper, we present three experiments that focus on several choice architecture 
innovations currently employed in ACA marketplaces and assess whether the results withstand 
sensitivity tests that incorporate uncertainty into the decision environment. Experiment 1 
examines the effect of adding information on the total costs a consumer will be expected to pay 
during the year under each health plan given their health care needs, and assesses the impact of 
making that information more prominent in the plan description and sorting plans by total 
expected costs. Experiment 2 tests whether nudging consumers about the importance of 
considering total expected costs in their plan decisions and educating consumers about the 
meaning of total expected costs can improve plan decisions further, under the assumption that 
being better informed will allow consumers to make better choices. By making the most 
important information more accessible and more salient, we hypothesize that consumers will be 
more successful in choosing cost-effective health plans. We further hypothesize that the 
additional information will be most beneficial to the most vulnerable population groups.  
Experiment 3 tests whether choice architecture influences health plan decisions as 
hypothesized above when medical spending and, thus, total expected costs, is uncertain and 





plan choices by choice architecture tested in Experiments 1 and 2, when total expected costs 
were certain, will be robust to choice scenarios when medical spending is uncertain. Finally, we 
hypothesize that the pattern of plan choices observed will be consistent with the notion that 
consumers who are risk averse are more likely to opt for more generous coverage as medical 
spending becomes more uncertain, further validating the ability of hypothetical plan choice 
scenarios to simulate real-world choices. These experiments are among the first to test how 
combinations of choice architecture elements affect the likelihood of cost-effective plan choices 
in marketplaces, to test the robustness of how these stated preference plan choice experiments 
perform under uncertainty, and to examine the benefits to vulnerable population groups targeted 
by the ACA’s coverage expansion efforts.  
1.2 A Conceptual Model of the Influence of Choice Architecture on Health Plan Decisions 
In the experiments that follow, we conceptualize the determinants of the cost-effective 
health plan choices (Figure 1, adapated from Barnes et al., 2017).3  Again, a cost-effective health 
plan choice is defined as one that minimizes total costs for the year (premiums and out-of-pocket 
health care spending) after taking into account expected health care needs. The main direct 
determinant of choosing a cost-effective health plan is health insurance literacy, which we posit 
as being determined by both choice architecture and numeracy. Choice architecture elements can 
influence consumers’ health plan choices directly by making identifying more cost-effective 
choices more straightforward, in part by reducing reliance on numeracy for plan comparisons, or 
                                                 
3 Much of the theoretical underpinnings for Figure 1 are given extensive treatment in Barnes et al. (2015).   In that 
paper, three mediation models were assessed to ascertain that, indeed, numeracy predicted health insurance literacy, 
which predicted alignment of self-reported motivations for plan choices and actual plan choices and, ultimately, the 
likelihood individuals choose the most cost-effective plan.  Further, Barnes et al. (2015) provide evidence 
suggesting the effects of choice architecture on choosing the plan with the lowest total expected costs can also be 






indirectly through improving consumers’ understanding of health insurance terminology to allow 
them to more easily evaluate differences between health plans (e.g., out-of-pocket maximums). 
Numeracy may influence cost-effective plan choices both directly by facilitating the calculations 
needed to compare health plans and indirectly through improved health insurance literacy.  
The bullet points under choice architecture in the figure reflect the specific elements that 
are tested in our experiments: showing total expected costs, sorting plans in different ways, 
nudging consumers to focus on their total expected costs, and providing “just-in-time” education 
about total expected costs. Each of these concepts is discussed in greater detail below, but some 
preliminary comments about sorting may be helpful here. Evidence from the marketing literature 
suggests that the order of available options affects the decisions made in online purchase 
environments (Haubl & Trifts, 1999; Sharkey, Acton, & Conboy, 2009). For example, 
consumers may select more expensive products when the available options are sorted from 
highest to lowest price (Suk, Lee, & Lichtenstein, 2012). Importantly, the specific attribute by 
which products are sorted tends to increase the weight that consumers place on that attribute 
(Quaschning, Pandelaere, & Vermeir, 2014). Thus, consumers rate quality as an important 
product attribute when products are sorted from highest to lowest quality, although sorting 
products from lowest to highest quality increases the perceived importance of price but not of 
quality (Cai & Xu, 2008). By extension, this literature suggests sorting health plan choices by a 
particular attribute may nudge consumers to place more decision weight on it, which could be 
used to assist ACA marketplace shoppers.  
When Medicare began providing comparative information about drug plans on its 
website in 2006 after passage of the Medicare Modernization Act in 2003, it chose to sort plans 





premiums and later by allowing consumers to enter the drugs they plan to have covered and to 
sort by total expected costs. Sorting was essential because consumers in most Medicare drug 
plan markets had more than 50 plans from which to choose. The ACA marketplaces followed 
suit in the initial 2014 open enrollment period. Since that time, some state markeplaces have 
become more sophisticated. In a study of the 2017 marketplaces, six of 12 state marketplaces 
sorted plans not by premiums, but by total expected costs (Clear Choices, 2017). Significantly, 
however, the federal marketplace, which is used in 38 states, continues to sort by premiums, and 
sorting health plan choices by premiums does appear to influence the plans that consumers 
choose (Wang et al., 2017). The experiments presented below are aimed, in part, to test whether 
a more sophisticated sorting method is helpful to consumers. 
 
2. Experiment 1: Increasing the Salience of Total Costs 
2.1 Methods 
Participants  
Data for Experiment 1 are from 8,253 respondents ages 18-64 to the September 2016 
Health Reform Monitoring Survey (HRMS), an internet-based survey tracking implementation 
of the ACA. The HRMS, which is based on KnowledgePanel, an internet panel that has been 
used for the National Science Foundation-funded Time-sharing Experiments for the Social 
Sciences (TESS) to support experiments similar to that conducted here.4 The KnowledgePanel is 
a probability-based internet panel of approximately 55,000 people recruited primarily from an 
address-based sampling frame covering 97 percent of US households. Additional information on 
the HRMS and KnowledgePanel is provided in the Appendix.  
                                                 





Measures and Procedures 
For Experiment 1, all participants were given a health care utilization scenario for the 
upcoming plan year. The scenario asked them to imagine they were buying coverage only for 
themselves and decide which of three health plans would best meet their needs if they expected 
their “use of medical services next year to be high, with several doctor visits and a hospital stay 
costing a total of $20,000.” Participants were randomly assigned to one of three marketplaces 
that were based on the choice architectures that have been used most commonly in the “window-
shopping” features of the federal and state-based marketplaces following the 2015-2016 open 
enrollment period. The marketplaces were simplified in that many of the design elements such as 
color, font size and filtering options were not replicated; instead, the hypothetical choice 
environments compared isolated specific choice architecture elements that vary across 
marketplaces. Consumer choice was tested across the following three marketplaces:  
 Premium Sort, No Total Costs: Plans were sorted by premium from lowest to highest with 
total expected costs not shown (Figure 2). This choice architecture shares similar design 
features as the state-based marketplaces in Colorado, Idaho, Massachusetts, New York, and 
Washington in 2015-16. 
 Premium Sort, Total Costs Shown: Plans were sorted by premium from lowest to highest 
with total expected costs shown elsewhere in the plan description. Monthly premium was 
again displayed in the upper left side of the plan description. This choice architecture was 
designed to replicate the 2015-16 design features from healthcare.gov, the federal 
marketplace. 
 Total Costs Sort: Plans were sorted by total expected costs from lowest to highest with 





plan description. This choice architecture shares similar design features as the state-based 
marketplaces in the District of Columbia, Minnesota, and Vermont in 2015-16. 
Respondents were asked to choose from three health plans, which were the same across 
each marketplace: a bronze plan with the lowest monthly premium and highest deductible and 
out-of-pocket maximum, a silver plan with a higher premium and a lower deductible and out-of-
pocket maximum, and a gold plan with the highest monthly premium and lowest deductible and 
out-of-pocket maximum. Plan cost structures were based on actual health plans sold through 
healthcare.gov in July 2016.5 Under the health care scenario presented, the gold plan was the 
most cost-effective choice, followed by the silver plan.  
After making health plan choice, participants were asked which plan features were most 
important in their decision: the monthly premium or total premiums for the year; annual 
deductible; annual out-of-pocket maximum; type of plan (i.e., bronze, silver, or gold); 
copayments or coinsurance; or total expected costs. The order of these response categories was 
randomized for all respondents to prevent primacy effects. While participants were able to go 
back and change their plan choice in the survey after answering this question, none did.  
The HRMS provides a rich array of  participant characteristics including: gender (male, 
female), age (18-30, 31-49, 50-64), health status (excellent/very good, good, fair/poor), 
race/ethnicity (white non-Hispanic, non-white non-Hispanic, Hispanic), educational attainment 
                                                 
5We used the website’s window-shopping tool to browse single plans available in Chicago for a 40-year-old 
nonsmoker with an annual income of $25,000 (below the premium tax credit eligibility threshold).  The location was 
chosen based on the availability of a wide selection of plans and insurers and the relatively moderate premiums 
compared with other major metropolitan areas. The scenario is consistent with the profile of adults in our sample in 
terms of average age and tobacco use. Approximately 40% of adults in our sample reported incomes in the subsidy 
eligibility range, 36% had incomes above this range, and 24% had incomes below it. This search yielded 51 plans 
sold by 7 insurers. Drawing on elements of the lowest-premium bronze plan, second lowest-premium silver plan, 
and gold plan with the lowest estimated total yearly costs based on high expected use of medical care, we created 3 
hypothetical plans for the experiment. Premiums, deductibles, and out-of-pocket maximums were modified to 





(less than high school, high school or some college, college graduate or higher), marital status 
(married, not married), family income (at or below 138% Federal Poverty Level (FPL), 139-
399% FPL, 400% FPL or higher), homeownership status (owns home, does not own home), 
citizenship status (reported being a citizen, did not report being a citizen), primary language 
(English, bilingual, Spanish), urban/rural status (lives in a metropolitan statistical area, does not 
live in a metropolitan statistical area).   
Self-reported health insurance literacy, numeracy, health care access, and affordability 
were also collected. Numeracy was based on respondents’ rating of their ability to work with 
numbers, such as working with fractions or percentages, a variation of a component of the 
Subjective Numeracy Scale (Fagerlin et al., 2007). Numeracy responses were categorized as 
excellent/very good, good, fair/poor. Health insurance literacy was based on reported confidence 
understanding seven basic health insurance terms (premium, deductible, copayments, 
coinsurance, maximum annual out-of-pocket spending, provider network, and covered services).  
Heath insurance literacy responses were collapsed into two categories: confident understanding 
all 7 insurance terms, not confident understanding all 7 insurance terms. Health care access was 
assessed based on reports of having one or more usual sources of care at the time of the survey.  
Affordability was assessed based on reports of having had an unmet need for care due to costs in 
the past 12 months; having had problems paying family medical bills in the past 12 months; 
having family medical bills that are being paid off over time (i.e., medical debt); and having an 
annual per-person deductible of $1,500 or more at the time of the survey. The measures of usual 
source of care, unmet care needs, medical debt, and problems paying family medical bills are 
based on questions that have been used in the National Health Interview Survey. Descriptive 





expected in a large randomized experiment, participant characteristics were generally balanced 
across conditions, with some variation in health status (p<0.10), education (p<0.05) and income 
(p<0.10) across marketplace assignment. 
Predictive margins from linear probability models controlling for the demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics listed above were used to estimate the adjusted share of adults in 
each marketplace who chose the most cost-effective plans, some other plan, or were unsure or 
did not choose a plan. We also estimated adjusted differences in the most important reasons for 
choosing a plan, among all adults who chose a plan and among those who chose the most cost-
effective plan. In addition, we estimated the share of adults in each marketplace choosing the 
most cost-effective plan across various subgroups based on their demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics, health insurance literacy and numeracy, and health care access 
and affordability experiences to understand differences across more and less vulnerable 
consumers. Additionally, we report whether our main results are robust among a subsample of 
respondents with family incomes of 139-399% FPL, those most likely to purchase plans in ACA 
marketplaces (n=3,266). All analyses were conducted in Stata.  
2.2 Results 
Choice of Health Plans by Marketplace Environment 
Across the three marketplace environments, 36.7% of participants chose the plan with the 
lowest total expected costs, 27.0% chose some other plan, and 36.3% did not chose a plan after 
adjustment for demographic and socioeconomic characteristics (see Table 2). The probability of 
choosing the plan with the lowest total expected costs increased as marketplace environments 
employed more choice architecture to assist consumer decision-making (32.5% in Premium Sort, 





p<0.05 each).6 Among the subsample of participants who were likely eligible for ACA subsidies 
in the marketplace (family income 139%-399% of FPL) the adjusted results were similar in that 
30.8% of subsidy-eligible respondents chose the plan with the lowest total expected costs in the 
Premium Sort, No Total Costs marketplace, 36.0% in the Premium Sort, Total Costs Shown 
marketplace, and 38.7% in the Total Costs Sort marketplace (p<0.05 each). 
The health plan selections observed also suggest that choice architecture may be shifting 
participants away from other plan choices to the most cost-effective plan on the one hand and, on 
the other, towards not selecting a plan. For example, participants in the Total Costs Sort 
marketplace were more likely than those in the Premiums Sort, No Total Costs marketplace 
(38.4% vs. 35.5%, p<0.05) and those in the Premium Sort, Total Costs Shown marketplace 
(38.4% vs. 34.7%, p<0.01) to select “did not choose a plan.” One likely explanation for this 
observation is that the Total Costs Sort choice environment may be providing new information to 
consumers, stimulating some of them to update their plan selection strategy (e.g., weight total 
expected costs more heavily than premiums) and requiring further consideration or additional 
education or information before choosing.  
Self-reported Importance of Plan Attributes in Choosing the Health Plan with the Lowest Total 
Expected Costs 
 To understand whether choice architecture influenced how participants choosing the most 
cost-effective health plan were comparing their options, we examined whether the health plan 
attributes participants reported as important factors in their plan choice varied across the three 
experimental marketplaces after adjustment for participant characteristics (Appendix Table B). 
                                                 
6 These choices translated into average adjusted excess spending of $275 for those who made health plan choices in 
the Premium Sort, No Total Costs relative to those choosing in the Total Cost Sort marketplace (p<0.01) and $93 in 
excess spending among those choosing health plans in the  Premium Sort, No Total Costs compared to the Premium 





Participants selecting the plan with the lowest total expected costs in the Premium Sort, No Total 
Costs marketplace were more likely to rate out-of-pocket maximum as most important compared 
to those in Premium Sort, Total Costs Shown (33.7% vs. 25.7%, p<0.05) and those in Total 
Costs Sort marketplaces (33.7% vs. 29.4%, p<0.05). Thus, participants in Premium Sort, No 
Total Costs who correctly calculated total costs on their own and chose the plan with the lowest 
total expected costs may have been more cognizant of the importance of the out-of-pocket 
maximums in contributing to cost differences between the three plans. Respondents in the 
Premium Sort, Total Costs Shown marketplace were more likely to rate total expected costs as 
most important compared to those choosing in Premium Sort, No Total Costs (45.5% vs. 34.7%, 
p<0.01) and those choosing in Total Costs Sort marketplaces (34.0%, p<0.01).   
Similarly, among the subsample of respondents eligible for ACA subsidies who chose the 
most cost-effective plan, those choosing in the Premium Sort, Total Costs Shown marketplace 
were more likely to report total expected costs as most important compared to those choosing 
plans in the Premium Sort, No Total Costs marketplace (43.3% vs. 29.1%, p<0.01) and those 
choosing in the Total Costs Sort (35.6% vs. 29.1%, p<0.05, Appendix Table C). These findings 
may suggest that, compared to sorting by total expected costs and featuring them at the top, 
actually “showing the math” for total costs by summing the premiums and out-of-pocket costs 
for consumers, even when premiums were sorted lowest to highest, provided a more salient 
signal to consumers than where total expected costs were placed on the screen. Interestingly, the 
Premium Sort, Total Costs Shown marketplace relied more on educating participants about how 
to calculate total costs for each plan while the Total Costs Sort marketplace was more of a 
traditional “nudge” by sorting plans for consumers by lowest total expected costs. This 





Variation in Choice Architecture Effects across Participant Demographic Characteristics 
 To better understand whether choice architecture in marketplace design benefits some 
consumers more than others, we examined whether differences in the likelihood of choosing the 
plan with the lowest total expected costs across marketplaces varied by participant 
characteristics. Reducing the cognitive burden of health plan choices through choice architecture 
improved decision-making for more and less vulnerable subgroups of participants by similar 
magnitudes (see Table 3). However, these improvements generally represented larger relative 
increases among more vulnerable populations given their lower probability of choosing the 
health plan with the lowest total expected costs in the Premium Sort, No Total Costs 
marketplace. For example, participants with excellent, very good, or good self-reported 
numeracy were 8.3 percentage points more likely to choose the most cost-effective plan in the 
Total Costs Sort marketplace compared to the Premiums Sort, No Total Costs marketplace, a 
22% relative increase (46.0% vs. 37.6%, p<0.01). Similarly, those reporting fair or poor 
numeracy were 7.8 percentage points more likely to choose the plan that minimized total 
expected costs, a 43% relative increase (25.9% Total Costs Sort vs. 18.1% Premium Sort, No 
Total Costs; p<0.01). Both participants with high confidence in understanding all insurance 
terms presented and those who were not as confident were roughly 8 percentage points more 
likely to choose the most cost-effective plan in the Total Costs Sort marketplace compared to the 
Premium Sort, No Total Costs marketplace (p<0.01 each); however, the magnitude of this effect 
represented a larger relative increase among participants with lower confidence in understanding 
insurance terminology (33%) compared to those with higher confidence (20%). A similar pattern 
was observed in Table 3 among those reporting attending high school or less vs. some college or 





currently covered by health insurance, and those reporting family income of 138% FPL or less 
vs. those at 139-399% FPL vs. those at 400% or above. Finally, relatively larger gains were also 
experienced among participants experiencing difficulty accessing and affording health care 
compared to those without access and affordability issues (Appendix Table D).   
2.3 Discussion 
Mounting evidence has revealed that consumers are facing difficulties in making cost-
effective choices when choosing health plans. In Experiment 1, we altered the choice 
environment consumers faced in the ACAs marketplaces by including and highlighting one of 
the key facets involved in choosing a health plan, total expected costs. This rather simple change, 
the results show, improved the quality of consumers’ decisions across the board, and especially 
among those with lower education, lower income and more limited health insurance literacy.  It 
also significantly increased the share who did not make a decision because they weren’t sure of 
the best option, which might lead to more efforts to obtain help in plan choice so that there could 
be additional gains over time in an actual market. At the same time, less than 40% of the sample 
chose the plan with the lowest total expected costs. Further, despite the larger relative gains 
among more vulnerable populations between the Premium Sort, No Total Costs and the Total 
Costs Sort marketplaces, the least vs. the most supportive choice environments, large gaps in the 
ability to choose the most cost-effective plan persist between these participants and those who 
were less vulnerable. This evidence suggests there are limitations to the immediate gains that can 
be achieved through modest choice architecture. Even when plan comparisons are simplified for 
participants, many consumers continue to have difficulty making a cost-effective health plan 
choice. To try to improve health plan choices even further, a second experiment was conducted 





more salient and just-in-time-education aimed to improve understanding of the importance of 
total expected costs—to the Total Costs Sort marketplace, the most supportive choice 
environment in the previous experiment. We hypothesized that providing additional education 
about total expected costs at the time the decision is made will lead consumers to focus more on 
these costs and hence choose the most cost-effective health plan more often.   
 
3. Experiment 2:  Added Value of Increased Salience and Just-in-Time Education  
3.1. Methods 
Participants 
A follow-up choice experiment was conducted with 9,532 respondents ages 18-64 in the 
March 2017 HRMS.   
Measures and procedure 
Building on Experiment 1 and following results surfaced by Johnson et al. (2013) 
suggesting that including just-in-time-education could boost the likelihood that consumers 
choose the most cost-effective plan, we added two manipulations to the Total Costs Sort 
marketplace: increasing the salience of total expected costs through a prompt to think about them 
when making a decision, and providing just-in-time education on total expected costs. 
Participants in Experiment 2 were randomly assigned to one of three variations of the Total 
Costs Sort marketplace from Experiment 1 and then asked to select a plan. 
 Total Costs Sort: Same prompt as Total Costs Sort in Experiment 1. 
 Total Costs Sort, Plus Salience: Same as Total Costs Sort, plus the following stimulus: 
“When choosing a health plan it’s important to think about total yearly costs, not just the 





 Total Costs Sort, Plus Salience and Education: Same as Total Costs Sort, Plus Salience, with 
the additional following just-in-time education: “Total yearly costs include your premiums 
for the year and your expected out-of-pocket spending on covered services under the plan.  
Out-of-pocket spending will include your spending under the yearly deductible plus any 
copayments and coinsurance for care after you reach the deductible up to the annual out-of-
pocket maximum under the plan, which is the most you have to pay for covered services in a 
year.”   
As with Experiment 1, characteristics were similar across experiment samples (Appendix 
Table E). Nonetheless, linear probability models of health plan choices across marketplaces 
controlled for participant characteristics. We report also whether our main results in Experiment 
2 are robust among a subsample of respondents with family incomes of 139-399% FPL, those 
most likely to purchase plans in ACA marketplaces (n=3,555).  
3.2 Results 
Health Plan Choices Across Marketplaces Sorted by Total Costs  
Overall, 47.0% of adults chose the plan with the lowest total expected costs (Table 4). 
Those in the Total Costs Sort, Plus Salience marketplace chose this plan more often (48.9%) than 
those who received the increased salience stimulus and just-in-time education on total expected 
costs (45.6%, p<0.05), but we found only weak evidence of improved choice between the Total 
Costs Sort and Total Costs Sort, Plus Salience marketplaces (46.5% vs. 48.9%, p<0.10).7 Similar 
differences were observed among participants who were likely eligible for ACA marketplace 
                                                 
7 The probability of choosing most cost effective health plan in the Total Costs Sort marketplace in Experiment 2 
(46.5%) was significantly higher than in Experiment 1’s equivalent marketplace (41.3%, p<0.01) and the probability 
of not choosing a plan was significantly lower (29.8% vs. 38.4%, p<0.01). Subsequent regression-adjusted analyses 
confirmed these differences were not due to sample overlap between the two rounds (i.e., some March 2017 HRMS 






subsidies, with those in the Total Costs Sort, Plus Salience marketplace more likely to choose the 
most cost-effective plan than those who received the increased salience stimulus and just-in-time 
education (47.4% vs. 42.0%, p<0.01). There were no differences in choosing the most cost-
effective plan between those in the Total Costs Sort and Total Costs Sort, Plus Salience and 
Education marketplaces for either the overall sample or those with income between 139 and 
399% FPL. However, among this latter group potentially eligible for ACA marketplace 
subsidies, we found weak evidence that participants choosing in the Total Costs Sort, Plus 
Salience and Education marketplace were more likely to not choose a plan than those in the Total 
Costs Sort, Plus Salience group (30.6% vs. 26.7%, p<0.10).   
Self-reported Importance of Plan Attributes in Choosing the Health Plan with the Lowest Total 
Expected Costs 
 Among those who chose the health plan with the lowest total expected costs, the most 
important factor in choosing this plan was total expected costs (Appendix Table F), but this 
varied by condition: those in the Total Costs Sort, Plus Salience and Education were more likely 
to report that total expected costs were the most important factor (43.4%) than those in the Total 
Costs Sort (36.6%, p<0.01) or those in the Total Costs Sort, Plus Salience marketplaces (37.0%, 
p<0.01). Those in the Total Costs Sort, Plus Salience and Education marketplace were also least 
likely to report that premiums were the most important factor in choosing a plan (6.7%) 
compared to those without the additional education information in the Total Costs Sort (8.7%, 
p<0.10) or those in the Total Costs Sort, Plus Salience marketplace (8.4%, p<0.10). Together 
these results suggest that providing consumers with education on how total expected costs are 





of premiums, even if this marketplace design did not result in as many of them actually choosing 
the correct plan.  
Variation in Choice Architecture Effects across Participant Demographics  
As in Experiment 1, we assessed demographic differences among those who chose the 
most cost-effective plan (Appendix Table G). Unlike Experiment 1, where more and less 
vulnerable consumers benefited from sorting plans by total expected costs, with more vulnerable 
consumers experiencing similar increases in magnitude in the likelihood of choosing the most 
cost-effective plan but larger relative increases, the same trends did not hold in Experiment 2. 
Overall there was little evidence that adding a prompt to increase the salience of total expected 
costs or just-in-time education to choice environments that sort and prominently display total 
expected costs reduced disparities in choosing the most cost-effective health plan.   
3.3 Discussion  
Counter our prediction, adding just-in-time education material did little to augment the 
likelihood consumers chose the most cost-effective plan. However, a simpler stimulus that 
reminded participants to think about total annual costs did lead to better choices. As suggested 
earlier in Experiment 1, choice architecture, in this case just-in-time education, may provide new 
information to consumers that stimulates them to re-evaluate their choice strategy (e.g., 
considering lowest total expected costs instead of lowest premiums), though this requires further 
investigation. Subsequent studies could examine whether consumers, after being provided just-
in-time education, seek additional information or help to make their decision. Our data, thus, 
indicate that including an intervention similar to the just-in-time educational material we tested 
might not offer additional benefits beyond offering a simpler reminder to incorporate total 





consumers without also providing additional education resources or assistance in choosing a 
health plan.    
 
4. Experiment 3: Does Choice Architecture Improve Consumer Health Plan Choices when 
Expected Spending is Uncertain?  
4.1. Methods 
Participants 
Building upon the findings from Experiments 1 and 2, a follow-up choice experiment was 
conducted with 1,805 respondents ages 18-64 to the September 2018 HRMS. The experiment 
was limited to adults who had medium or high expected use of health care services in the coming 
year, where medium or high expected use was self-reported by asking participants, “(w)hich of 
the following best describes the use of medical care you expect for the next year? 1) Low use: 
few or no doctor visits or medical tests, occasional or no prescription drugs, no hospital visit 
expected, 2) Medium use: regular doctor visits or medical tests, regular prescription drugs, 
hospital visit possible but unlikely, or 3) High use: frequent doctor visits, frequent prescription 
drugs, frequent medical tests, or at least one hospital visit likely.” Descriptions of medium or 
high expected use of health care services over the coming year were based upon those used on 
healthcare.gov. Participants with low expected use were not included in the experiment as their 
lowest-cost plan would be the same as the lowest-premium plan. 





HRMS participants with self-reported medium or high expected use of health care were 
randomly assigned to the following three marketplaces:8  
 Premium Sort, No Total Costs from Experiment 1 (n=605).  
 Premium Sort, Total Costs Shown, Plus Salience, combining choice architecture from 
Experiments 1 and 2  (n=600).  
 Total Costs Sort, Plus Salience from Experiment 2 (n=600).  
Similar to Experiment 2, the total cost salience statement included in the Experiment 3 
prompt for the latter two conditions was the following: “When choosing a health plan it’s 
important to think about the total yearly costs that you would expect to have to pay under the 
health plan, not just the premium you would have to pay every month.”  After making an initial 
plan choice based on a known amount of expected costs (medical bills of $10,000), participants 
were assigned to one of two scenarios where medical spending over the coming year was 
uncertain. Half of the participants were randomized to a condition where they were asked to 
choose a plan imagining an 80% vs. 20% chance of having medical bills of $1,000 vs. $10,000 
and half were randomized to a condition with an 80% vs. 20% chance of having medical bills of 
$10,000 vs. $1,000. In each condition, participants were given estimated total costs for each of 
the two possible medical spending scenarios for each health plan (e.g., for Plan A: 80% chance 
of $8,200 in total expected costs and a 20% chance of $2,200 in total expected costs; Figure 3) .   
  After each plan choice, participants were asked “Can you tell us why you chose plan (A, 
B, C)?” with the following response options available: 1) It was the plan that was the cheapest in 
terms of estimated total yearly costs, 2) It was the plan that was the cheapest in terms of 
                                                 
8 Compared to the previous experiments, the plan list to choose from in Experiment 3 was simplified by omitting 
information about copayments/coinsurance for each plan and providing all of the remaining plan information in a 





premiums, 3) It was the plan that was most affordable for me, 4) I wanted to be sure I had 
enough coverage, 5) I guessed, or 6) Don’t know. Participants could only select one of the 
motivations for plan choice listed above. 
In addition to collecting information described above on the demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics of participants, a risk aversion measure from the MEPS self-
administered questionnaire was included in the September 2018 HRMS (see Appendix Tables H 
and I). Specifically, respondents were asked, “Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree 
with the following statement: I’m more likely to take risks than the average person,” where 
response options range from strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (5)” (AHRQ, 2016).  
Responses were collapsed into three categories – risk taking (1 or 2), risk neutral (3), or risk 
averse (4 or 5) to proxy for the curvature of participants’ utility function with respect to wealth, 
an important factor in health insurance decision-making under uncertainty (Rice & Unruh, 2015). 
Linear probability models were used to test for differences in plan choices and reasons for plan 
choices across conditions and expected vs. uncertain medical spending scenarios after adjustment 
for the same set of participant demographics and socioeconomic characteristics controlled for in 
the previous experiments and risk aversion.  
4.2. Results 
Does the Influence of Choice Architecture Differ with the Uncertainty of Medical Spending? 
The first objective of Experiment 3 was to test whether choice architecture influenced health 
plan decisions when total expected costs were uncertain. To make that assessment, we first 
sought to replicate the effects of choice architecture on choosing the most cost-effective health 
plan when medical spending was known in the current sample and then introduce uncertainty of 





performance from the previous experiments when expected medical spending was known, 
respondents randomized to the Premium Sort, Total Costs Shown, Plus Salience marketplace 
were more likely than those in the Premium Sort, No Total Costs marketplace to choose the plan 
with the lowest total expected costs after adjustment (48.9% vs. 43.0%, p<0.10). No significant 
differences were found in the probability of choosing the most cost-effective plan between those 
randomized to the Total Costs Sort, Plus Salience marketplace and participants choosing in either 
the Premium Sort, No Total Costs or Premium Sort, Total Costs Shown, Plus Salience 
marketplaces.   
There were also no differences in choice of the plan with the lowest total expected costs 
between choice architecture conditions when expected medical spending was uncertain but low 
(80% vs. 20% chance of having medical bills of $1,000 vs. $10,000). However, when 
respondents faced health plan choices where spending was uncertain but high (80% vs. 20% 
chance of having medical bills of $10,000 vs. $1,000), those in the Total Costs Sort, Plus 
Salience marketplace were more likely than those in the Premium Sort, No Total Costs 
marketplace to choose the most cost-effective plan (43.5% vs. 37.0%, p<0.10).  
Consistency of Plan Choices across Certain and Uncertain Medical Spending Scenarios 
 A second objective of Experiment 3 was to assess whether choice architecture affects the 
ability to consistently choose the most cost-effective plan across certain and uncertain spending 
scenarios. Overall, respondents were 14.6 percentage points (p<0.01) more likely to choose the 
most cost-effective plan when total costs were uncertain but expected to be high compared to 
when they were uncertain but expected to be low. In regard to the choice architecture and the 
consistency of choosing the most cost-effective plan under certain and uncertain medical 





were more likely than those in the Premium Sort, No Total Costs group to consistently choose 
the most cost-effective health plan under the known cost scenario and when medical spending 
was uncertain but expected to be low (13.6% vs. 8.2%, p<0.05 before adjustment; Appendix 
Table J). However, respondents in the Total Costs Sort, Plus Salience group were not more likely 
than those in Premium Sort, No Total Costs group to consistently choose the plan with the lowest 
total expected costs across the known cost scenario and when medical spending was uncertain 
but expected to be high. These result suggests that the choice architecture is helping participants 
consistently choose the most cost-effective plan choices when spending is certain (Gold plan) 
and when the medical spending is uncertain but low (Bronze plan) but not when it is uncertain 
but high (Gold plan). Overall, most participants were not able to consistently choose the plan 
with the lowest total costs: 11.3% of participants consistently chose the most cost-effective plan 
both when costs were certain and uncertain but low, whereas 33.4% consistently chose the most 
cost-effective plan when costs were certain and uncertain but high. 
Does Choice Architecture Affect the Motivations for Plan Choices when Medical Spending is 
Uncertain? 
 A third objective of Experiment 3 was to test whether choice architecture may be 
operating on consumer health plan decisions by influencing the reasons participants reported 
choosing the plan they did when medical spending was uncertain. Participants in the Premium 
Sort, Total Costs Shown, Plus Salience marketplace were more likely than those in the Total 
Costs Sort, Plus Salience marketplace to report choosing a plan because it was “cheapest in terms 
of total yearly costs” (43.3% vs. 33.2, p<0.01; see Appendix Table K). When medical spending 
was uncertain but expected to be low, those in the Premium Sort, Total Costs Shown, Plus 





(46.8% vs. 30.4%, p<0.01) or Premium Sort, No Total Costs marketplaces (36.4%, p<0.01) to 
report choosing their plan because it was the lowest in total costs and less likely to report 
choosing it because it was “cheapest in terms of premiums” (2.8% Premium Sort, Total Costs 
Shown, Plus Salience vs. 14.2% Total Costs Sort, Plus Salience vs. 11.0% Premium Sort, No 
Total Costs, p<0.01).  
These findings may suggest that participants in the Premium Sort, Total Costs Shown 
Plus Salience marketplace had to search for the plan with the lowest total costs so, among those 
choosing this plan, actively comparing plans based on total costs may reinforce the reported 
motivation for making plan choices based on this attribute. Regardless of condition assignment, 
participants who consistently chose the most cost-effective plan across both the known and 
uncertain insurance choice scenarios were more likely than those who did not to report choosing 
the cheapest plan in terms of total yearly costs as a reason for their choice (51.4% vs. 31.6%; 
p<0.01), and less likely to report they “guessed or did not know” why they chose the plan they 
did (3.2% vs. 8.3%, p<0.01; see Appendix Table L). These effects were consistent across those 
randomized to the uncertain but low expected medical spending and those in the uncertain but 
high expected spending conditions. 
Are Hypothetical Health Plan Choices Consistent with Consumer Risk Aversion? 
A final objective of Experiment 3 was to examine whether consumer choice in the 
experimental marketplaces was consistent with predictions of how more versus less risk averse 
consumers should behave and whether the effects of choice architecture varied by consumer risk 
aversion. Broadly, we find that choices in the experimental insurance marketplaces were 
consistent with curvature of utility with respect to wealth, with people who report 





the uncertainty of wealth increases. First, risk averters were more likely to choose the plan with 
the lowest total costs when costs were certain than respondents who were risk neutral (49.8% vs. 
42.6%, p<0.05) and were less likely not to choose a plan at all (26.2% vs. 37.0%, p<0.05, 
Appendix Table M). Further, when medical spending was uncertain but low, participants who 
were risk averse were less likely than those who were risk taking to choose the plan with the 
lowest total costs (Bronze plan; p<0.01). Conversely, risk averters were more likely than those 
who were risk neutral to choose the most cost-effective plan when medical spending was 
uncertain but expected to be high (Gold, p<0.10).   
4.3. Discussion 
In Experiment 3, we tested the sensitivity of the results of the first two experiments to more 
natural choice scenarios in which consumers select plans when future medical spending is 
uncertain. We first found that the marketplaces that increased the salience of total costs increased 
the likelihood of choosing the plan with the lowest total costs when expected medical spending 
was uncertain but likely to be high, as was found in the previous experiments when total 
expected costs were known with certainty. Second, when medical spending was uncertain but 
expected to be high, we found that respondents were more likely to choose the most cost-
effective health plan compared to when medical spending was uncertain but likely to be low. 
Further, compared to the Premium Sort, No Total Costs environment, the Total Costs Sort, Plus 
Salience environment may have helped participants understand the cost structure of the plans and 
update their plan choices as expected medical spending changed. Importantly, although choice 
architecture improved decision-making, regardless of condition assignment, most participants 





Interestingly, we found that participants shopping in the Premium Sort, Total Costs Shown, 
Plus Salience marketplace were more likely than those in the Total Costs Sort, Plus Salience or 
those in the Premium Sort, No Total Costs marketplaces to report choosing a plan because it was 
the cheapest in terms of lowest total costs and less likely to report choosing a plan based on it 
being the cheapest in terms of premiums. One possible explanation is that these individuals had 
the total costs information available and were prompted to consider total costs but had to search 
for the plan with the lowest total costs, potentially reinforcing their reported motivation for 
making plan choices based on total costs. Additionally, across conditions, participants who 
consistently chose the plan with the lowest total costs in known and uncertain choice scenarios 
were more likely to report total yearly costs as a reason for their choice and less likely to report 
that they guessed or were not sure. Finally, results were consistent with the assumption that 
utility with respect to wealth is a concave function for risk averse consumers, such that 
participants in Experiment 3 who reported higher risk aversion were also more likely to choose 
more generous coverage as medical spending became more uncertain. 
 
5. General Discussion 
Health insurance is one the most significant financial and health-related decisions that 
consumers in the US make. Yet, lack of knowledge about health insurance as well as the 
complex nature of this decision renders this task extremely difficult. Under the Affordable Care 
Act, US states and the federal government have varied the decision environments consumers face 
when choosing which insurance to purchase. The current three studies examined how different 





findings are to manipulation checks testing assumptions about consumer behavior when medical 
spending is uncertain. 
Among the key findings of Experiment 1 was evidence of a gradient in improving choice 
quality with increasing choice architecture. Specifically, comparing the Premium Sort, Total 
Costs Shown marketplace to the Premium Sort, No Total Costs marketplace indicates that sorting 
by premium and showing total expected costs increases the likelihood that adults make the cost-
effective choice by 3.6 percentage points relative to sorting by premium and not displaying total 
costs. These estimates were consistent with a previous study finding a 3.0 percentage point 
increase in choosing the most cost-effective plan when total costs were presented (Barnes et al., 
2017). But, when plan choices were sorted by total expected costs, as they were in the Total 
Costs Sort marketplace, consumers were an additional 5.2 percentage points more likely to 
choose the most cost-effective plan compared to the Premium Sort, Total Costs Shown 
marketplace, for a total improvement of 8.8 percentage points compared to the Premium Sort, No 
Total Costs marketplace.  
However, even in the most supportive decision environment and when given a simple 
insurance choice task, more than one-third of participants were unsure which of the three plans 
was best for them. Interestingly, this uncertainty in plan choice increased between the Total 
Costs Sort and Premium Sort, Total Costs Shown marketplaces. These results could suggest that 
the choice architectures tested were moving some participants along a choice continuum by 
shifting people away from choosing higher cost plans and towards being unsure about what 
decision is best for their health care needs and ultimately, we would expect, shifting them 





The inclusion of total expected costs in the choice environment improved plan choice 
quality for adults of all demographic and socioeconomic backgrounds, including for adults with 
high and low numeracy and high and low health insurance literacy, and for adults with and 
without access and affordability barriers to receiving care. More vulnerable subgroups of 
respondents tended to experience larger relative benefits between the Premium Sort, No Total 
Costs and Total Costs Sort marketplaces compared to less vulnerable participants. This is in 
large part due to more vulnerable participants having a lower “floor” and performing worse in 
the Premium Sort, No Total Costs marketplace. Despite the relatively larger improvements in 
choice quality among more vulnerable participants, large gaps in the probability of choosing the 
plan with the lowest total costs persisted between more and less advantaged subgroups. 
Even though improvements in plan choice were observed as total cost information was 
made more salient in Experiment 1, the choice architecture does not appear to be influencing the 
plan attributes participants report they find most important when making a decision. Thus, choice 
architecture may improve plan choice in ways that are not directly apparent to consumers. This is 
perhaps an indication of the power of “nudges” in that they may operate on choice by leveraging 
the biases and heuristics consumers face rather than relying on consumers’ deliberative or 
evaluative decision-making processes. However, the results raise an interesting counterpoint 
where consumers in the Premium Sort, Total Costs Shown marketplace were more likely to rate 
total expected costs as most important compared to those choosing the other marketplaces. 
Recall that the Premium Sort, Total Costs Shown marketplace had relied more on educating 
participants about how to calculate total costs for each plan while the Total Costs Sort 
marketplace was more of a traditional “nudge” by sorting plans for consumers based on lowest 





decision-making process (Johnson et al., 2013), Experiment 2 combined the most effective 
choice architecture introduced in Experiment 1 with two different potential additional 
improvements to the decision environment.  
When taken broadly, the results from Experiment 2 suggest the benefits of nudging 
consumers to choose plans that minimize total expected costs by sorting plans by total costs 
rather than premiums could not be improved further by making the importance of total costs 
more salient or by also providing just-in-time education about them. In contrast to our 
expectations, participants who received educational information about total costs plus a prompt 
about the importance of these costs performed worse than those who received only the prompt to 
consider the importance of total costs. In other words, adding an educational component when 
making an insurance decision did not enhance performance achieved when sorting by total costs. 
However, more participants chose the second-lowest total cost plan when choosing in a 
marketplace that sorted by total costs and included the additional salience message and the just-
in-time education compared to the other two marketplaces tested in Experiment 2.  
Interestingly, participants who received the just-in-time educational material were more 
likely to indicate that total annual cost was the most important factor in their decisions. Thus, 
while it seems that our manipulation helped participants focus on the most important factor, it 
somehow failed to translate into implementing the choice that minimized those costs. Overall, 
while policy makers and marketplaces might be tempted to include more extensive information 
about each health plan attribute, our data indicate that this might not be the best strategy. 
Furthermore, in both Experiments 1 and 2 participants indicated that premiums served as a key 
ingredient in their decision-making process regardless of the structure of the information 





salient factors, but convey rather limited and potentially misleading information, one possibility 
to improve health plan choices is to simply remove information about premiums from the initial 
plan comparison pages on marketplace websites (but have them easily accessible by selecting an 
additional page) and present total expected annual costs prominently along with other attributes 
such as provider networks and plan quality.  
Experiments 1 and 2 prompted participants to consider their health insurance choices if 
their annual medical expenditures were high but known. However, expected health care use is 
unpredictable and consumers differ in their distaste for risk. Experiment 3 examined how 
consumers respond to the choice architecture employed in Experiments 1 and 2 when medical 
expenditures are uncertain. Similar to Experiments 1 and 2, sorting by total costs and increasing 
their salience appeared to help consumers choose plans with the lowest total expected costs even 
when costs were uncertain. Importantly, decision-making under uncertainty aligned with theory-
based predictions about risk aversion and health insurance choices. These findings underscore 
the potential value of sorting plans by attributes that choice architects aim to focus consumers’ 
decision weighting on and of salience cues in health insurance marketplaces. Even careful 
marketplace design, however, may not help all consumers make optimal choices. In Experiment 
3, as with the previous experiments, most participants still did not choose the plan with the 
lowest expected costs.  
Our study was specifically designed to test choice architecture mechanisms relevant to 
the ACA marketplaces. Devising novel ways to help millions of consumers make better 
decisions is of clear importance. At the same time, one might wonder if the present work could 
be applied to other cases. While this is somewhat speculative, as we do not have empirical data 





part D, with over 40 million beneficiaries (many of which could be classified as vulnerable 
consumers), is one prominent example, given the large corpus of data showing that beneficiaries 
often do not choose the best plan (e.g., Abaluck & Gruber, 2009; Abaluck & Gruber, 2016; Zhou 
& Zhang, 2012). Extending our findings to Medicare part D, in fact, could be the next logical 
step, as it could allow consumers to compare between the plans and make a better decision. The 
financial domains, where consumers often face challenges in choosing retirement plans, credit 
cards, and loans, could also serve as other contexts where our ideas and work could be 
informative. This might be especially helpful for individuals who have low numeracy skills, as 
our design reduces (or even eliminates) the need to perform any calculation. Needless to say, 
these conjunctions will need to be empirically tested.   
    Several limitations should be noted. The study was hypothetical by nature and may not 
capture the complexity of real life health insurance decision-making. Nonetheless, empirical 
evidence, such as that provided by our three studies, is necessary to inform policy makers on 
how to optimize designs of health insurance markets for consumers. These experiments did not 
include incentives, which could have led to smaller differences in choice quality across 
marketplaces by rewarding consumers for placing more effort in their shopping experience 
during the two experiments. However, experimental evidence from prior hypothetical insurance 
experiments suggests that incentives do little to improve decision-making (Johnson et al. 2013). 
Also, evidence from the employer-sponsored markets suggest that one-third to one-half of 
employees choose plans that place them at greater financial risk compared to other plans 
available to them (Bhargava, Loewenstein, and Sydnor 2015; Sinaiko and Hirth 2011). This 
suggests that decision errors due to consumer difficulties understanding and choosing insurance 





experiments suggest that consumers are choosing in hypothetical marketplaces in a way that is 
consistent with their reported level of risk aversion.   
Shopping experiences in the experiments we tested were not tailored to ACA marketplace 
subsidy eligibility, largely due to survey and programming constraints to present each participant 
in a national probability sample with a likely subsidy they would face. Furthermore, our studies 
focused on one important and simplified dimension of insurance choice, the amount of financial 
risk protection a plan confers given a certain high-cost health event will occur. Other attributes of 
plan options, including plan quality and provider networks, are important in consumer decision-
making and our results are unable to account for the tradeoffs between risk protection and other 
attributes of coverage consumers weigh when choosing plans. Regarding participant 
comprehension of plan attributes and the plan selections they were asked to make, the evidence 
suggests many consumers have difficulty understanding and comparing the various dimensions 
of health plans. Even though the experiments provided definitions of terms to participants and 
pilot-tested decision prompts, participants may have been challenged to understand the 
objectives of the choice tasks. Further, participants may have conflated their own experiences or 
health status with the decision prompt, though this is mitigated in Experiment 3 where the tasks 
were only given to respondents reporting medium or high expected medical use. Finally, a 
logical extension of this study would be to investigate the welfare implications of choice 
architecture that is or could feasibly be employed in the ACA marketplaces.  
In conclusion, millions of Americans face the difficult task of choosing health insurance 
in the ACA marketplaces. How these markets are designed has a crucial impact on consumers’ 
ability to compare and choose health plans that provide adequate risk protection and are 





sorting by and highlighting the total estimated cost in a prominent place—could help improve the 
quality of health insurance choices, saving money for consumers and the government alike. Our 
data also reveal that including additional educational material does little to improve consumers’ 
choices, suggesting the need for other strategies to make further improvements in consumer 
decision-making. Such findings can be extended to improving insurance choices for consumers 
shopping in Medicare managed care markets, stand-alone Medicare drug plan markets, and 
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Health insurance literacy Cost-effective health plan choice: 
Choose a health plan that minimizes 
total expected costs for the year 
(premiums and out-of-pocket), given 
expected health care needs Choice architecture elements used in ACA 
marketplaces: 
 Show total costs 
 Sort plans  
 by premiums 
 by total costs 
 Nudge consumers to focus on total costs 










Figure 2. Experiment 1: Marketplace Plans Sorted by Premium (with or without Total Costs Shown) or Sorted by Total Costs 
For this question, we would like you to consider a hypothetical situation.  Imagine that you are buying health insurance coverage only for 
yourself for next year. Imagine that you have a choice of three health insurance plans that are all offered by the same company and that 
the doctors and other health care providers you use are included in the networks for all three plans. 
 
IF you expected your use of medical services next year to be high, with several doctor visits and a hospital stay costing a total of 
$20,000, which of the three health insurance plans shown in the table below do you think would best meet your health insurance needs?  
       
Premium Sort, No Total Costs (Plans Sorted by Premiums, Total Costs Not Shown) 





Annual out-of-pocket maximum 
$6,800 
Total premiums for the year    $1,200 Copayments / Coinsurance 
Doctor visits: $0 copayment 
No coinsurance after deductible 





Annual out-of-pocket maximum 
$5,000 
Total premiums for the year    $1,800 Copayments / Coinsurance 
Doctor visits: $0 copayment 
10% coinsurance after deductible 





Annual out-of-pocket maximum 
$2,500 
Total premiums for the year    $3,600 Copayments / Coinsurance 
Doctor visits: $0 copayment 






Premium Sort, Total Costs Shown (Plans Sorted by Premiums, Total Costs Shown) 





Annual out-of-pocket maximum 
$6,800 
Total premiums for the year    $1,200 
Estimated deductible, copayments,  
coinsurance, and other costs             $6,800 
___________________________________ 
Total yearly costs             $8,000 
Copayments / Coinsurance 
 
Doctor visits: $0 copayment 
No coinsurance after deductible  





Annual out-of-pocket maximum 
$5,000 
Total premiums for the year    $1,800 
Estimated deductible, copayments,  
coinsurance, and other costs             $5,000 
___________________________________ 
Total yearly costs              $6,800  
Copayments / Coinsurance 
Doctor visits: $0 copayment 
10% coinsurance after deductible  





Annual out-of-pocket maximum 
$2,500 
Total premiums for the year    $3,600 
Estimated deductible, copayments,  
coinsurance, and other costs            $2,500 
___________________________________ 
Total yearly costs              $6,100 
Copayments / Coinsurance 
Doctor visits: $0 copayment 






Total Costs Sort (Plans Sorted by Total Costs) 
Plan A  Gold  




Annual out-of-pocket maximum 
$2,500 
Monthly premium              $300 
Total premiums for the year  $3,600  
Estimated deductible, copayments,  
coinsurance, and other costs  $2,500  
Copayments / Coinsurance 
Doctor visits: $0 copayment 
10% coinsurance after deductible 
Plan B  Silver  




Annual out-of-pocket maximum 
$5,000 
Monthly premium              $150 
Total premiums for the year  $1,800  
Estimated deductible, copayments,  
coinsurance, and other costs  $5,000  
Copayments / Coinsurance 
Doctor visits: $0 copayment 
10% coinsurance after deductible 
Plan C  Bronze  




Annual out-of-pocket maximum 
$6,800 
Monthly premium              $100 
Total premiums for the year  $1,200  
Estimated deductible, copayments,  
coinsurance, and other costs  $6,800  
Copayments / Coinsurance 
Doctor visits: $0 copayment 







Table 1. Characteristics of Adults Ages 18 to 64, Overall and by Marketplace Choice Environment in Experiment 1 
Participant characteristic  All adults 
Premium Sort, 




Total Costs Sort 
Gender       
Male 49.0% 49.0% 48.2%    49.8%    
Female 51.0% 51.0% 51.8%    50.2%    
Age        
18-30 28.7% 28.2% 28.3%    29.6%    
31-49 38.3% 38.8% 38.6%    37.5%    
50-64 33.0% 33.0% 33.1%    32.9%    
Health Status        
Excellent/very good 51.0% 49.9% 51.1%    51.9%    
Good 34.7% 36.2% 34.2%    33.9%  *  
Fair/poor 14.2% 13.8% 14.7%    14.1%    
Race/ethnicity        
White, non-Hispanic 62.0% 61.2% 62.6%    62.1%    
Nonwhite, non-Hispanic 20.7% 20.8% 20.5%    20.9%    
Hispanic 17.3% 18.0% 16.9%    17.0%    
Educational attainment        
High school less 39.8% 38.8% 39.1%    58.3%  ^^ 
Some college or more 60.2% 61.2% 60.9%    29.6%  ^^ 
Self-reported health insurance literacy        
Confident in understanding of insurance terms 51.1% 50.5% 51.0%    51.7%  
Not confident understanding of insurance terms 48.9% 49.5% 49.0%    48.3%  
Self-reported numeracy        
Excellent/very good 49.2% 49.1% 49.0%    49.5%  
Good 26.5% 26.4% 26.6%    26.4%  
Fair/poor 23.7% 24.0% 23.7%    23.5%  
Marital status        
Married 51.8% 52.3% 51.6%    51.4%    
Not married 48.2% 47.7% 48.4%    48.6%    





Participant characteristic  All adults 
Premium Sort, 




Total Costs Sort 
At or below 138% Federal Poverty Level (FPL) 28.1% 26.7% 28.9%  *  28.7%    
139-399% FPL 36.0% 36.5% 35.8%    35.8%    
400% FPL or higher 35.8% 36.8% 35.3%    35.4%    
Homeownership status        
Owns home 63.0% 62.6% 62.4%    63.9%    
Does not own home 37.0% 37.4% 37.6%    36.1%    
Citizenship status        
Reported being a citizen 87.6% 87.3% 88.2%    87.4%    
Did not report being a citizen 12.4% 12.7% 11.8%    12.6%    
Primary language        
English 86.7% 86.2% 87.2%    86.8%    
Bilingual 9.4% 9.9% 8.7%    9.4%    
Spanish 3.9% 4.0% 4.1%    3.7%    
Urban/rural status        
Lives in metropolitan statistical area 85.7% 85.8% 85.3%    85.9%  
Does not live in metropolitan statistical area 14.3% 14.2% 14.7%    14.1%  
Sample Size 8,253 2,686 2,731   2,836   
 
Source: Health Reform Monitoring Survey, quarter 3 2016. 
*/**/*** Estimate differs significantly from Premium Sort, No Total Costs marketplace at the .10/.05/.01 level, using two-tailed tests.  







Table 2. Choice of Plans among Adults Ages 18 to 64, by Marketplace Choice Environment in Experiment 1 
 Overall 
Premium Sort, No 
Total Costs 
Premium Sort, 
Total Costs Shown 
Total Costs 
Sort  
 All Adults               
Chose plan with lowest total expected costs 36.7% 32.5% 36.1%  ***  41.3%  *** ^^^ 
Chose some other plan 27.0% 32.0% 29.2%  **  20.3%  *** ^^^ 
Did not choose a plan 36.3% 35.5% 34.7%    38.4%  ** ^^^ 
Sample size 8,253 2,686           2,731     2,836   
 
Adults with Family Income 139%-399% FPL 
       
Chose plan with lowest total expected costs 35.2% 30.8%           36.0%  **  38.7%  ***    
Chose some other plan 30.0% 34.6%           32.4%    23.2%  *** ^^^ 
Did not choose a plan 34.8% 34.6%           31.6%    38.1%   ^^^ 
Sample size 3,266 1,072          1,077  1,117   
 
Source: Health Reform Monitoring Survey, quarter 3 2016. 
Notes: Estimates are adjusted for the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics listed in Table 1. Nearly all of those who did not 
choose a plan reported that they were not sure which plan met their needs. 
*/**/*** Estimate differs significantly from Premium Sort, No Total Costs marketplace at the .10/.05/.01 level, using two-tailed tests. 







Table 3.  Variation in Choice Architecture Effects on Percent Choosing Plan with Lowest Total Expected Costs in Experiment 1, 
by Participant Characteristics  
  
By Self-Reported Numeracy 
Excellent/very good/good Fair/poor 
Sample size 
% Choosing Plan with Lowest 
Total Costs 
Sample size 
% Choosing Plan with Lowest 
Total Costs 
Premium Sort, No Total Costs 2,044 37.6%   629 18.1%    
Premium Sort, Total Costs Shown 2,061 40.1%   658 23.4% **   
Total Costs Sort  2,161 46.0% *** ^^^ 660 25.9% ***   
  
By Self-Reported Health Insurance Literacy 
Confident understanding all health insurance 
terms 
Not confident understanding all health insurance 
terms 
Sample size 
% Choosing Plan with Lowest 
Total Costs 
Sample size 
% Choosing Plan with Lowest 
Total Costs 
Premium Sort, No Total Costs 1,429 40.2%   1,257 25.2%    
Premium Sort, Total Costs Shown 1,456 42.6%   1,275 29.2% **   
Total Costs Sort  1,538 48.2% *** ^^ 1,298 33.4% *** ^ 
  
By Education 
Some college or more High school or less 
Sample size 
% Choosing Plan with Lowest 
Total Costs 
Sample size 
% Choosing Plan with Lowest 
Total Costs 
Premium Sort, No Total Costs 1,713 39.9%   973 21.5%    
Premium Sort, Total Costs Shown 1,760 43.6% **  971 24.3% *   
Total Costs Sort  1,792 50.5% *** ^^^ 1,044 27.8% ***   
  
By Age 
18-44 years old 45-64 years old 
Sample size 
% Choosing Plan with Lowest 
Total Costs 
Sample size 
% Choosing Plan with Lowest 
Total Costs 
Premium Sort, No Total Costs 1,244 29.5%   1,442 37.1%    
Premium Sort, Total Costs Shown 1,294 34.1% **  1,437 38.6%    
Total Costs Sort  
 










% Choosing Plan with Lowest 
Total Costs 
Sample size 
% Choosing Plan with Lowest 
Total Costs 
Premium Sort, No Total Costs 1,275 34.7%   1,411 31.0%    
Premium Sort, Total Costs Shown 1,288 38.9% ***  1,443 33.3%    
Total Costs Sort  1,370 43.4% *** ^ 1,466 38.8% *** ^^ 
  
By Health Status 
Excellent/very good/good Fair/poor 
Sample size 
% Choosing Plan with Lowest 
Total Costs 
Sample size 
% Choosing Plan with Lowest 
Total Costs 
Premium Sort, No Total Costs 2,283 34.5%   401 21.9%    
Premium Sort, Total Costs Shown 2,294 37.8% **  434 25.6%    
Total Costs Sort  2,394 42.6% *** ^^^ 439 31.5% ** ^ 
  
By Health Insurance Coverage 
Insured all year Not insured all year 
Sample size 
% Choosing Plan with Lowest 
Total Costs 
Sample size 
% Choosing Plan with Lowest 
Total Costs 
Premium Sort, No Total Costs 2,244 36.4%   438 16.4%    
Premium Sort, Total Costs Shown 2,291 38.8% *  433 22.5% **   
Total Costs Sort  2,350 44.8% *** ^^^ 476 25.3% ***   
  
By Family Income 
400% FPL or higher 139-399% FPL 
Sample size 
% Choosing Plan with Lowest 
Total Costs 
Sample size 
% Choosing Plan with Lowest 
Total Costs 
Premium Sort, No Total Costs 963 48.6%   1,072 30.9%     
Premium Sort, Total Costs Shown 939 49.7%   1,077 36.3% **   
Total Costs Sort  983 57.2% *** ^^^ 1,117 38.4% ***   
 At or below 138% FPL     
 
Sample size 
% Choosing Plan with Lowest 





Premium Sort, No Total Costs 651 13.6%        
Premium Sort, Total Costs Shown 715 19.0% *       
Total Costs Sort  736 24.6% *** ^^     
Source: Health Reform Monitoring Survey, quarter 3 2016. 
Notes: Estimates are unadjusted.  
*/**/*** Estimate differs significantly from Premium Sort, No Total Costs marketplace at the .10/.05/.01 level, using two-tailed tests. 







Table 4. Choice of Plans among Adults Ages 18 to 64, by Marketplace Choice Environment in Experiment 2 
 Overall Total Costs Sort 
Total Costs Sort, 
Plus Salience 
Total Costs Sort, Plus 
Salience and 
Education 
 All Adults        
Chose plan with lowest total expected costs 47.0%       46.5%   ### 48.9%    45.6%   ^^ 
Chose some other plan 23.2%       23.6%   ### 22.1%    24.0%      
Did not choose a plan 29.8%       29.8%   ### 29.0%    30.4%      
Sample size 9,532 3,182 3,128     3,222   
 
Adults with Family Income 139%-399% FPL 
       
Chose plan with lowest total expected costs 44.9% 45.2% 47.4%    42.0%   ^^^ 
Chose some other plan 26.9% 27.6% 25.9%    27.4%      
Did not choose a plan 28.1% 27.2% 26.7%    30.6%   ^ 
Sample size      3,555 1,208 1,189  1,158   
Source: Health Reform Monitoring Survey, quarter 1 2017. 
Notes: Estimates are adjusted for the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics listed in Table 1. 
#/##/### Estimate in Experiment 2 Total Costs Sort marketplace differs significantly from estimate in Experiment 1 Total Costs Sort 
marketplace at the .10/.05/.01 level, using two-tailed tests. 





Figure 3. Experiment 3 Marketplace Example: Plans Sorted by Premiums, Total Costs 
Shown, Plus Salience. Medical Spending was Uncertain but Expected to be High. 
 
Now imagine there is an 80% chance your use of medical care next year will result in medical 
bills of $10,000, and a 20% chance your use of medical care next year will result in medical 
bills of $1,000. 
 
Which of the three health insurance plans shown in the table below do you think would best meet 
your health insurance needs?   
 















Estimated total yearly costs 
 
$8,200 (80% chance) 
$2,200 (20% chance) 
 















Estimated total yearly costs 
 
$7,400 (80% chance) 
$3,400 (20% chance) 
 














Estimated total yearly costs 
 
$5,600 (80% chance) 
$4,600 (20% chance) 
 
1. Plan A 
2. Plan B 






Table 5. Choice of Plans among Adults Ages 18 to 64, by Marketplace Choice Environment in Experiment 3 
    
     
 
Overall Premium Sort, No 
Total Costs 
Premium Sort, Total 
Costs Shown, Plus 
Salience 
Total Costs 
Sort, Plus Salience 
Known cost scenario – expected bills of $10,000     
Chose plan with lowest total expected costs 46.9% 43.0% 48.9%* 48.5% 
Chose some other plan 23.4% 25.0% 24.8% 20.5% 
Did not choose a plan 29.7% 32.0% 26.3%* 30.9%^ 
Sample Size 1,805 605 600 600 
Variable cost scenario #1 - 80% chance of bills of 
$1,000, 20% chance of bills of $10,000 
    
Chose plan with lowest total expected costs 23.8% 23.6% 24.6% 23.3% 
Chose some other plan 46.1% 47.9% 46.4% 44.1% 
Did not choose a plan 30.1% 28.5% 29.0% 32.6% 
Sample Size 904 304 297 303 
Variable cost scenario #2 - 80% chance of bills of 
$10,000, 20% chance of bills of $1,000 
    
Chose plan with lowest total expected costs 40.1% 37.0% 39.9% 43.5%* 
Chose some other plan 28.2% 27.1% 35.3%** 22.4%^^^ 
Did not choose a plan 31.7% 35.9% 24.8%*** 34.2%^^ 
Sample Size 901 301 303 297 
Source: Health Reform Monitoring Survey, quarter 3 2018. 
Notes: Estimates are adjusted for the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics listed in Table 1 and risk aversion. 
*/**/*** Estimate differs significantly from Premium Sort, No Total Costs at the .10/.05/.01 level, using two-tailed tests. 
^/^^/^^^ Estimate differs significantly from Premium Sort, Total Costs Shown, Plus Salience at the .10/.05/.01 level, using two-tailed 
tests. 
 
